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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A COMPLEXITY
EXCEPTION TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
JOSEPH A. MIRON, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment
of the Constitution has generated much controversy.' By invoking a
complexity exception, a court can withhold issues from the jury be-
cause of their legal or factual complexity and decide the issues itself.
2
In essence, courts use a complexity exception to foster accurate
verdicts.
3
Proponents and opponents of the complexity exception continue
to debate its constitutionality. 4 Several authors have concluded that a
* J.D. Candidate Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1999; M.B.A., Finance, DePaul Univer-
sity; B.A., Finance, Michigan State University. I wish to thank Patrick Cotter for his guidance
and insight during the research and writing of this note. His assistance and direction throughout
were invaluable.
1. There have been numerous articles written in both law reviews and journals on this
topic. E.g., Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Maxwell M. Blecher & Candace E. Carlo, To-
ward More Effective Handling of Complex Antitrust Cases, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 727; Maxwell M.
Blecher & Howard F. Daniels, In Defense of Juries in Complex Antitrust Litigation, 1 REV. Li-
TIG. 47 (1980); James S. Campbell & Nicholas Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A
Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 965 (1980); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex
Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980);
Patrick Lynch, The Case for Striking Jury Demands in Complex Antitrust Litigation, 1 REV. Li-
TIG. 3 (1980); Daniel H. Margolis & Evan M. Slavitt, The Case Against Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, LITIG., Fall 1980, at 19; Jeffrey Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand
in Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243 (1980).
2. See infra Part III.A.
3. See generally infra note 5 (collecting articles supporting the theory of a complexity
exception).
4. Scholars also debate whether the complexity exception is wise from a policy perspec-
tive. Compare Lynch, supra note 1, at 3 ("The jury is as inappropriate to some antitrust cases
today as the wild west gunfighter is to modern Abilene."), with Lisa S. Meyer, Taking the "Com-
plexity" Out of Complex Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 372 (1993) ("[J]udges and litigants can and must manage cases in a way in
which jurors are afforded all necessary assistance to understand and decide complex cases.").
Two commentators reported that "a growing number of legal scholars think the [jury] reforms
would make for more reliable, accurate verdicts." Tamar Jacoby & Tim Padgett, Waking Up the
Jury Box, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1989, at 51. Additionally, Judge Posner made some interesting
remarks in Litigation Magazine. See Jeffrey Cole, Economics of Law: An Interview with Judge
Posner, 22 LITIG., Fall 1995, at 66-67. Judge Posner stated that he would be in favor of a com-
plexity exception in certain "complex commercial cases." Id. at 66. To justify this opinion, he
stated that, "it's unfair really to put people through the task of trying to understand a subject
which people of higher education and intellectual attainment spend a lifetime studying with im-
perfect understanding." Id. at 67. Given Judge Posner's affection for efficiency theories, his
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complexity exception is constitutional, 5 while others argue the oppo-
site case.6 This note argues that it is, and finds support for the com-
plexity exception not only in the traditional historical constitutional
analysis, but also in the the Supreme Court's opinion in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc.7 Using this recent decision from the Court,
in combination with prior case law and the ideology present in English
common law, this note investigates the constitutionality of the com-
pexity exception and concludes that a complexity exception is
constitutional.8
The original Constitution lacked provisions for fundamental
rights and so did not provide for the right to a jury trial in civil actions.
This deficiency was one of the chief factors in the push for the Bill of
Rights. 9 The Federalists and the Anti-Federalists differed over
whether the right to a jury trial in civil actions should be constitu-
tional. The Anti-Federalists favored codifying this right in the federal
compact because of the absence of fundamental rights.10 Their argu-
ments won the day, and in 1791 the Seventh Amendment was enacted,
providing for a civil jury trial for "suits at common law."" One of the
questions 12 that has arisen regarding the meaning of the deceptively
opinions could be biased because bench trials may result in more efficient adjudication, even if
for the sole reason that twelve fewer people are involved. However, Judge Posner's opinions
are, at a minimum, predictive of the decision that would result if a complexity exception was
proposed under the right circumstances in the Seventh Circuit.
5. For articles proposing that there is a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment,
see Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 1, at 965-66; Devlin, supra note 1, at 107; Kenneth S.
Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1992); Lynch, supra note 1, at 3; Margolis & Slavitt, supra note 1, at 19;
Oakes, supra note 1, at 243; Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. et al., A Bicentennial Transition: Modern
Alternatives to Seventh Amendment Jury Trial in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 63, 66
(1988).
6. For articles proposing that there is no complexity exception to the Seventh Amend-
ment, see Arnold, supra note 1, at 830; Blecher & Carlo, supra note 1, at 744; Blecher & Daniels,
supra note 1, at 48; James L. Flannery, Note, Complex Civil Litigation: Reconciling the Demands
of Due Process with the Right to Trial by Jury, 42 U. PITr. L. REV. 693, 694 (1981); Meyer, supra
note 4, at 341.
7. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
8. A finding of constitutionality should not be interpreted as a vote supporting actual use
of the exception. A finding of constitutionality means only that the complexity exception is an
option available to the courts. Another available burden on the Seventh Amendment right ap-
proved by the Court is jury size. The Court has held that downsizing the jury fifty percent from
twelve members to six members is not a violation of the Seventh Amendment. See Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973). The Court stated that the protection provided was the right to
trial by jury, "rather than the various incidents of trial by jury." Id. at 155-56.
9. See Klein, supra note 5, at 1017.
10. See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in
Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 16 (1993).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
12. For additional issues related to the Seventh Amendment, see infra Part II.
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simple phrase "suits at common law" 13 is whether the Seventh
Amendment properly admits an exception to the right to a jury where
the facts are highly complex; i.e., a "complexity exception."
The question of the constitutionality of a complexity exception
hinges on whether the ideology of the common law of England in 1791
warrants such an exception 14 because the Supreme Court interprets
the Seventh Amendment as providing for a jury trial in situations
where eighteenth century English common law did so.15 This note
summarizes authority indicating that the theory of a complexity ex-
ception was adopted and accepted in the English system of common
law prior to 1791. Because the Seventh Amendment is guided by
English common law, and because complex cases were often withheld
from juries in English common law, the complexity exception to the
Seventh Amendment is constitutional. The fact that the courts have
not chosen to invoke this power until recently does not cast doubt on
the constitutionality of the theory. 16 Courts have begun to realize that
a mechanistic approach to interpreting the Seventh Amendment is no
longer effective. In other words, granting or not granting a jury trial
based on a static list considers the form but not the substance of Eng-
lish common law, to which courts ought to turn in reading the Seventh
Amendment. Markman signifies the Supreme Court's willingness to
recognize this perspective.
Before presenting the reasoning behind the finding of constitu-
tionality for a complexity exception, this note first provides some nec-
essary background information. In Part II, the note discusses the
history and development of the Seventh Amendment, focusing partic-
ularly on the notion of a complexity exception. In Part III, the note
traces the complexity exception from its existence in English common
law to its current use and explains characteristics of a case that may
cause a court to invoke a complexity exception, including some of the
arguments for and against its present day application. This part also
argues that the complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment is
constitutional because it is consistent with the operation of English
common law prior to 1791. Finally, in Part IV, the note argues that
the Supreme Court has adopted the theory of a complexity exception
through its decisions in Ross v. Bernhard and, more recently,
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
14. See articles cited supra note 1.
15. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
16. As this note will show, the complexity exception debate had its origin in 1970, in Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
19981
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Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. Part IV also highlights an al-
ternative argument for the constitutionality of a complexity exception
to the Seventh Amendment based on the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
II. HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Basis in English Common Law and History Surrounding the
Enactment of the Seventh Amendment
Several scholars have identified the English monarchy's attempts
to weaken the power of juries in early colonial America as one of the
driving forces behind the Declaration of Independence, 17 which pro-
tests the lack of "the benefits of trial by jury."'1 8 The records of the
Federal Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 indicate
that the Constitution's framers discussed civil jury trials only on Sep-
tember 12 and September 15.19 It is likely that the original Constitu-
tion does not provide for a right to civil jury trial because "[t]he
Representatives of the people," as James Madison explained, "may be
safely trusted in this matter. ' 20 In any case, the authors sent the Con-
stitution to the Continental Congress on September 17, 1787, without
any reference to civil jury trials.
21
To address this omission, the Continental Congress introduced
the Seventh Amendment in 1789 as part of the Bill of Rights; it be-
came law on December 15, 1791. The Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
22
As the language illustrates, the provision only applies to "suits at com-
mon law."'23 In addition, Congress used the ambiguous word "pre-
served" instead of a more precise term, such as "guaranteed. ' 24 The
17. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 595-96 (1993).
18. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 1776).
19. See Landsman, supra note 17, at 597-98 (citing Edith Guild Henderson, The Back-
ground of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 293 (1966)).
20. Henderson, supra note 19, at 293 (citing James Madison, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (1937)).
21. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 295.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
23. Id.
24. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
460 (1977) ("The point is that the Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury
as the exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases.").
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available commentary accompanying the enactment of the Amend-
ment sheds light on this word choice. It appears the fluid state of the
right to a jury trial at the time prompted the selection of the vaguer
term.2 5 The term "preserved" also suggests that the framers meant to
recognize an existing right, not create a new one.
26
Before the thirteen colonies ratified the Constitution, they all had
already instituted some form of civil jury trials, typically in a Bill of
Rights.2 7 Differences in the way the states codified the right to a civil
jury trial made it unclear exactly what right was "preserved" by the
Seventh Amendment. 28 Hence, early American judges turned to Eng-
lish common law for guidance in interpreting the Seventh Amend-
ment.29 This interpretive practice is an important building block for
fully understanding the Seventh Amendment. After the adoption of
the Articles of Confederation, and before the adoption of the Consti-
tution, no consistent operation of civil juries existed in the thirteen
colonies.30 Alexander Hamilton commented on the differences in jury
practices between the states.31 "In this State," he observed, "our judi-
cial establishments resemble ... those of Great Britain. We have
courts of common law,... a court of admiralty, and a court of chan-
cery."'32 Hamilton went on to explain the differences between the
states concerning the availability of a civil jury trial, focusing on states
that had a court of chancery and the types of cases heard there.
33
25. For an in-depth analysis of the confusing history of the Seventh Amendment, see gener-
ally Henderson, supra note 19; Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
26. See Landsman, supra note 17, at 600.
27. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 25, at 655 (quoting L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY-LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 281 (1960)).
28. The difficulty arises because there was not a universal practice that could be
"preserved."
29. See, e.g., United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 523-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1904) ("The great difference between the limits of the jury trial in different States is not gener-
ally understood; ... [Tihere is a material diversity ... in the extent of the institution of trial by
jury in civil cases, in the several States; ... no general rule could have been fixed upon by the
convention which would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States ....");
Henderson, supra note 19, at 294-95 (explaining that the lack of any guarantee of jury trial in
civil cases was due to Federalist beliefs "that because of the great diversity of state civil practice
no single formula could satisfy everyone"); Klein, supra note 5, at 1022 (same).
30. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 299 (noting the "power of the civil jury and the extent
of judicial control over its verdicts varied enormously and unsystematically from state to state");
Klein, supra note 5, at 1010 (same).
31. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 523-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1904).
32. Id. at 524.
33. See id. at 524-26.
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This confusing patchwork of state civil jury trial doctrine would
yield two developments in the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment
jurispridence. First, as we shall see below, the Supreme Court was
forced to reason from the only consistent body of law available: Eng-
lish common law. Second, the Supreme Court has declined to incor-
porate the Seventh Amendment into the Fourteenth and apply it to
the states.34 This latter development has had minimal effect, however,
because most states have enacted statutes providing from some from
of jury trial in civil cases. 35
B. Early Interpretation-The Courts' Development of the
"Mechanistic Approach"
Prior to 1970, the interpretation of the Seventh Amendment was
straightforward. In fact, in the period shortly after its enactment, the
courts interpreted the Seventh Amendment broadly. If there was any
question, judges recognized a right to a jury trial.36 Given the political
culture at the time, this policy is understandable. America had just
gone through the revolution, fueled in part by the English refusing to
guarantee the right to a jury trial. 37 The seminal American case inter-
preting the Seventh Amendment is United States v. Wonson.38 In
Wonson, the defendant was accused of violating the Embargo Supple-
mentary Act of 1808. 39 Justice Story ruled that a jury trial should be
granted if one would have been granted under similar conditions by
English common law.40 According to Justice Story, the phrase "com-
mon law" in the Seventh Amendment is "[b]eyond all question.., not
the common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all),
but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our
jurisprudence.
41
34. See Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877) (citing Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. 532,
557 (1874)). The Court has "consistently refused to rule that preservation of civil jury trial is an
essential element of ordered liberty required of the states by the due process clause of the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment." In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1085
(3d Cir. 1980).
35. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; IL. CONST. art. I, § 13; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14; see
also Paul B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amend-
ment?, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 737, 748 (1989).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
37. See, e.g., Roger W. Kirst, The Jury's Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (1982).
38. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
39. See id. at 745.
40. See id. at 750.
41. Id.
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With that, Justice Story laid the foundation for the "historic ap-
proach" for determining whether the right to a jury trial exists.
42
Given the nature of the determination, this note will refer to this ap-
proach as the "mechanistic approach": if the right to a civil jury trial
existed at common law, it must exist under the Seventh Amendment.
As one commentator stated, "[n]o federal case decided after Wonson
seems to have challenged this sweeping proclamation; perhaps later
judges have hesitated to appear to be the kind of intractable person
that would require Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on the obvious.
43
Given the circumstances, Justice Story was left little choice but to con-
clude that "common law" referred to the common law of England.
"Federalist 83, with which Justice Story was familiar, made clear that
if 'common law' was read as a reference to American practice, then it
provided no guideline at all. Each of the thirteen states had its own
corpus of common law rules."
44
Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment has developed further
since Wonson. In the seminal case of Thompson v. Utah,45 the Court
fixed 1791 as the year of reference to English common law for decid-
ing whether a jury trial should be granted.46 At the time of Thomp-
son, in 1898, the federal courts were still split between courts of law
and courts of equity.47 Therefore, the line of cases after Thompson
focused on applying the mechanistic approach to differing fact pat-
terns, "particularly to retain the common-law distinction between the
province of the court and that of the jury, whereby,... issues of law
are to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined
by the jury .... "48
Initially, the mechanistic approach was an efficient method for
interpreting and applying the Seventh Amendment. For a time, no
significant growth in the types of actions encountered took place;
hence, judges had little difficulty comparing the instant action to those
tried in English common law prior to 1791. The relevant English com-
42. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 571 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (quoting Wolfram,
supra note 25, at 640-43); Kirst, supra note 37, at 12; Georgiana G. Rodiger, Note, Has the Right
to a Jury Trial as Guaranteed Under the Seventh Amendment Become Outdated in Complex Civil
Litigation?, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 189, 191-92 (1980).
43. Wolfram, supra note 25, at 641.
44. Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the Historical
Rationale of the Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013, 1020 (1994).
45. 170 U.S. 343 (1898), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
46. See id. at 350.
47. See, e.g., id.
48. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
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mon law was contemporary and thus familiar to them, making com-
parison and application less difficult than it is for a judge today.
More recently, when Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, the district courts of law and equity merged in the
federal system,49 although the right to a jury trial at common law re-
mained undisturbed in the rules themselves.50 If the same court heard
both legal and equitable issues and decided the equity issues first,
however, the adjudication of the equity issues might collaterally estop
a jury from retrying those issues. In the landmark case of Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,51 the Supreme Court held that trying the
equitable claims first imposed an injunction on the legal claims, which
effectively denied the right to a jury trial.5 2 The Court, therefore, or-
dered a jury trial on all issues in the case. 53
Comparing the instant action to eighteenth century actions under
English common law is an increasingly difficult one for courts to un-
dertake. Today the boundaries between cases involving law and those
involving equity are unclear. 54 English reports before the nineteenth
century are incomplete and unreliable. 55 Moreover, courts today face
radically different legal issues than they did in the eighteenth century.
For example, the antitrust laws enacted since 1791 are among the most
complex legal theories in history. These laws are often involved in
cases where a complexity exception is proposed. 56 The substantive
law in a typical antitrust case may incorporate several legal theories in
one section, hardly a comparable situation to an eighteenth century
case. 57
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38; see also Beanunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d
563, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1942); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE § 2301, at 14 (3d ed. 1995).
51. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
52. See id. at 506-07. The Court restricted this ruling, however, in Katchen v. Landy, 382
U.S. 323 (1966). In Katchen, the Court stated that Beacon Theatres was meant to be a general
rule and that a court was not bound by this rule. See id. at 338-40. Subsequently, the Court
restricted Katchen to apply to administrative proceedings only. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 194-95 (1974).
53. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 508.
54. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 293-95.
55. See Arnold, supra note 1, at 840-46.
56. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980).
57. For an example of the difficulty of modem antitrust law, peruse 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994).
Now imagine applying these concepts to over 2,000 exhibits, over 20 million documents, and
over one-hundred thousand pages of deposition testimony, as well as a trial period in excess of
two years. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 895
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
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Thus, recent decisions are increasingly critical of the mechanistic
approach. This criticism comes largely in response to the strained
analyses by judges trying desperately to hammer a modern action into
an action known to the common law of England prior to 1791.58 An-
other criticism of the mechanistic approach is its shortsightedness. It
looks only at a static list of actions in which a jury trial was granted
and does not consider the underlying rationale in those actions.
59
Therefore, some modern courts have finally begun to alter the mech-
anistic approach in interpreting the Seventh Amendment.60 These
courts recognize that a more appropriate manner of interpreting the
Seventh Amendment is to apply the rationale underlying the granting
of a jury trial in England, not just to look at causes of action on a
predetermined list.
In summary, the history and interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment is a crucial building block in the discussion of a complex-
ity exception because the question of the existence and the constitu-
tionality of the complexity exception hinges on whether the ideology
of the common law of England in 1791 warrants such an exception.
The Supreme Court therefore interprets the Seventh Amendment as
providing for a jury trial in situations where eighteenth century Eng-
lish common law did so. This test requires the court to decide whether
an issue more closely resembles an eighteenth century legal or equita-
ble action, and then to decide whether the relief sought in the action is
legal or equitable in nature.61 Of these two considerations, the type of
relief sought is more important because it represents the essence of
the cause of action.62 If the plaintiff asks for money damages, the ac-
tion is typically legal, and if the plaintiff is asking the court to order
the defendant to do something, the action is typically equitable.
63
58. See Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 574 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring); cases cited infra notes 183-85.
59. See Teamsters, 494 U.S. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring).
60. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (holding that
"functional considerations" should be considered in the granting of a jury trial); Ross v. Bern-
hard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (stating that the "practical abilities and limitations of juries"
should be considered in the decision to grant a jury trial).
61. See, e.g., Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97
(1991) (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987)); see Krist, supra note 37, at 12-
13. Since the merger of the equity and legal courts in 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were enacted, a comparison of the pending action to eighteenth century actions has
become less important. See Flannery, supra note 6, at 696-97. This is because both of these
types of actions are now tried in the same forum. As indicated here, however, the importance of
the type of relief sought continues to be a determinative factor.
62. See Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 97 (quoting Teamsters, 494 U.S. at 565).
63. See Joel B. Harris & Lenore Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust
Case?, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 611, 627 (1979).
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Given the history and interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, this
note will now proceed to discuss the theory and development of the
complexity exception within this framework.
III. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF A COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION
A. Existence of a Complexity Exception in English Common Law
1. Historical foundation in England
The English common law in 1791 allowed the Chancellor to with-
hold complex cases from the jury.64 In these cases, the Chancellor
assumed the role of judge and jury and tried both the factual and legal
issues.65 He exercised this power whenever he concluded that a case
involved issues beyond the understanding of the jury.66 While this cri-
terion for judging complexity may be simplistic, the pertinent fact is
that the principle of removing complex cases from a jury was accepted
in English common law, and therefore should be part of the Seventh
Amendment today.
The right to a jury trial in English civil cases, while practically
nonexistent today,67 was originally guaranteed by the Magna Carta,
signed by King John on June 15, 1215.68 By 1791, the English legal
system was divided into the Court of Chancery (presided over by the
Chancellor and also referred to as the Court of Equity) and the
Courts of Common Law. 69 There were three courts of "common
law": the King's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer. 70
The judicial procedures and operational characteristics of these courts
differed. Most importantly for this discussion, actions pursued in the
Courts of Common Law used juries, while the Court of Chancery did
not.71 The type of remedy sought determined which court would hear
a civil case. An action for damages was typically legal and thus heard
64. See infra Part III.A.2. Compare Arnold, supra note 1, at 848 (finding no "evidence of
an eighteenth-century American or English belief that complexity was a ground for the exercise
of equitable jurisdiction"), with Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 1, at 974 n.45 ("[G]ranting
[as much as Professor Arnold does] concedes the argument. If equity had concurrent jurisdiction
of complex cases, thus giving the chancellor the discretion to bring them into the court of chan-
cery, . . . then the litigation ... was removed from the scope of the seventh amendment.").
65. See Devlin, supra note 1, at 50.
66. See id. at 65-107.
67. See id. at 106.
68. See Arnold, supra note 10, at 13.
69. See Rodiger, supra note 42, at 193.
70. See Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary
on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. Rav. 1571, 1572 (1983).
71. See Rodiger, supra note 42, at 193. Further, the operation of the Courts of Law were
considered "very dilatory, inconvenient, and unsatisfactory." Id. at 193 n.24 (citing 1 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EoUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 442, at 416 (9th ed. 1866)).
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in the Courts of Common Law, while an action seeking to compel the
defendant to do something was typically equitable and heard in the
Court of Chancery.
72
There were other ways to get into the Court of Chancery. For
example, if a party was not satisfied with a decision received from a
Court of Law, he could petition the Chancellor to intervene by means
of the Court of Chancery. 73 When this practice originated, no definite
rules regulated the Chancellor's intervention. 74 It is clear, however,
that the Chancellor had the final say over which cases would be heard
in the Courts of Common Law and which cases would be heard in the
Court of Chancery. As noted by Maitland:
In James I's day occurred the great quarrel between Lord Chancel-
lor Ellesmere and Chief Justice Coke which finally decided that the
Court of Chancery was to have the upper hand over the courts of
law. If the Chancery was to carry out its maxims about trust and
fraud it was essential that it should have a power to prevent men
from going into the courts of law and to prevent men from putting
in execution the judgments that they had obtained in courts of
law.... King James had now a wished-for opportunity of appearing
as supreme over all his judges, and all his courts, and acting on the
advice of Bacon and other great lawyers he issued a decree in favor
of the Chancery. From this time forward the Chancery had the up-
per hand. It did not claim to be superior to the courts of law, but it
could prevent men from going to those courts, whereas those courts
could not prevent men from going to it.
75
The Chancellor interfered with cases scheduled for the Courts of
Common Law, removing them to the Court of Chancery, when one of
several situations arose. The first type of removal occurred when an
individual seeking relief felt that the common law had not provided
justice.76 In this situation, the party seeking relief had to petition the
Chancellor, who could grant her case a hearing in the Court of Chan-
cery.77 The second type of removal involved cases where the common
law recognized that a wrong had occurred but lacked the power to
levy a just remedy. 78 In these instances, the Chancellor could assume
jurisdiction over the case or the party seeking relief could petition the
Chancellor. 79 The third type of removal occurred when the Chancel-
72. See Harris & Liberman, supra note 63, at 627.
73. See Devlin, supra note 1, at 59-60.
74. See Devlin, supra note 70, at 1572.
75. Devlin, supra note 1, at 49-50 (emphasis added).






lor judged that the Courts of Common Law were being misused as "an
instrument of injustice. ' 80 In these situations, the Chancellor had sole
discretion to assume jurisdiction over the case.81
Finally, the Chancellor could prevent a case from being heard in
the law courts and assume jurisdiction over it based on its complex-
ity.82 The Chancellor would interfere with a case in the Courts of
Common Law whenever, in his opinion, the details of the case were
beyond the jury's understanding. This last instance forms the basis for
arguing that the idea of a complexity exception was accepted in Eng-
lish common law, thereby incorporating it into current Seventh
Amendment analysis.
2. English case law supporting the theory of a complexity
exception
Because of the radical differences between the issues confronted
in the legal system today and those encountered in 1791, it is not pos-
sible, in a literal sense, to compare them systematically. Therefore, it is
necessary to take the analysis a step deeper and identify the common
theme, or philosophical basis, in the situations where a trial by jury
was denied. The next step is to identify the factual circumstances in
those situations in which a jury trial was not granted. This analysis
reveals that the decision to remove a case from the Courts of Com-
mon Law and therefore from trial by jury was within the sole discre-
tion of the Chancellor.
The involvement of complex or extensive written evidence was
perhaps the most common scenario in which the Chancellor would
assume jurisdiction over a case on complexity grounds. Two cases that
illustrate this point are Clench v. Tomley,83 decided in 1603, and Gyles
v. Wilcox,8 4 decided in 1740. Clench, a civil case for possession of per-
sonal property, was tried in the Court of Chancery, contrary to the
80. Id. at 1572-73 (quoting J. MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE
COURT OF CHANCERY, at 102-03 (1st ed. London 1780)).
81. See id.
82. See infra Part IV.A.
83. 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603). This note reports the case name as it appears in the English
Reports. However, "documents in the Public Record Office in London show that the defend-
ant's name was Clench and the plaintiff's name was Towneley, rather than the reported
'Tomley.' Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 1, at 966 n.5. Although this note will cite the
case by its now infamous name, Campbell and Le Poidevin cite the case as "Towneley v.
Clench."
84. 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740), cited in Barrett E. Pope, Non-Jury Trial of Civil Litigation:
Justifying a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 897, 914
(1981).
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pleading of the defendant, who requested trial by jury.85 In removing
the case, the Chancellor stated that the average juror was not adept
enough to read the complex documents, which accounted for the ma-
jority of the evidence central to the case.86 The Chancellor referred to
the issue as one "to be discerned by books and deeds, of which the
Court was better able to judge than a jury of ploughmen.
''87
In Gyles, the plaintiff sought an injunction to stay the printing of
an allegedly plagiarized book.88 The Chancellor found the facts in
Gyles too complex for a "common jury" because of the extensive
reading that would be required. 89 Unlike today, jurors of the time
were commonly illiterate. Therefore, in cases requiring extensive
reading of any kind, whether or not the material itself was complex,
the Chancellor would take it upon himself to decide both the legal and
factual matters. The Chancellor's statement in Gyles typifies this
argument:
The court is not under an indispensable obligation to send all facts
to a jury, but may refer them to a master, to state them, where it is a
question of nicety and difficulty, and more fit for men of learning to
inquire into, than a common jury. The House of Lords very often, in
matters of account which are extremely perplexed and intricate, re-
fer it to two merchants named by the parties, to consider the case,
and report their opinions upon it, rather than leave it to a jury.90
Wedderburn v. Pickering,91 decided in 1879, is another example of
a court denying a jury trial due to complex written evidence, although
it was heard after 1791. Wedderburn involved a dispute over the own-
ership of real property. 92 The Chancellor commented on his discre-
tion to remove a complex case from a jury:
I do not forget that this common law right, if I may so call it, ought
not to be taken away by mere caprice, but only when there is some
reason why the case cannot be conveniently tried before a jury....
'This rule was framed expressly to meet cases which would, under
the old system, have been tried in the Chancery Division, and which
might be considered, by reason of involving a mixture of law and
fact, or from great complexity, or otherwise, not capable of being
conveniently tried before a jury.' 93
85. See Clench, 21 Eng. Rep. at 13.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See 26 Eng. Rep. at 489.
89. Id. at 490-91.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. 13 Ch. D. 769 (1879), cited in Rodiger, supra note 42, at 194.
92. See id. at 769.
93. Id. at 771 (emphasis added) (quoting Clarke v. Cookson, 2 Ch. D. 746 (1876)).
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In denying a jury trial, the Chancellor explained, "I think that this
action is one which cannot be conveniently tried before a jury. It is a
conveyancing action.... [T]he ownership of this site is entirely a ques-
tion of title, and depends upon the construction of certain deeds. ' 94
While Wedderburn might be discounted to a certain extent because it
was decided after 1791, 95 the Chancellor based his decision on his un-
derstanding of pre-1791 cases of "great complexity" and "cases that
would, under the old system have been, tried in the Chancery Divi-
sion. ' '96 It is clear that the Chancellor believed that complex cases
should be, and always had been, within the realm of the Court of
Chancery.
In addition to extensive written evidence, complex legal theories
also caused for the Chancellor to withhold issues from the jury. Gart-
side v. Isherwood,97 decided in 1783, has both characteristics. Gartside
involved an action to nullify executed leases obtained by the defend-
ants through "fraud and imposition."98 The complexity in this case
arose because the leases had been obtained from a deceased person of
weak intellect upon inadequate consideration. 99 In referring to the
role of the jury, the Chancellor stated that only "neat matter[s] of
fact" should be left to them.100 With regard to more complicated is-
sues, "[i]t will, therefore, be improper to direct the issues in the man-
ner mentioned by the defendants, . . . for this will leave all the
circumstances of the case to be decided upon by the jury, and will put
it upon them to exercise the peculiar jurisdiction of a [C]ourt of
[E]quity." 101 Apparently, the Chancellor referred to whether the con-
tract was supported by fair and valuable considerations, which re-
quired the jury to make a legal conclusion regarding the competency
level of the plaintiff.10 2
Welles v. Middleton,10 3 decided in 1784, and Blad v. Bamfield,10 4
decided in 1674, also both fall into this category. Welles involved for-
94. Id.
95. Wedderburn still provides persuasive authority for two reasons. First, the Chancellor
made no indication that he was establishing new law with his decision. See generally id. at 771-72.
Second, as indicated, the Chancellor states that cases of "great complexity" would have been
tried in Chancery (i.e. no jury). See id at 771.
96. 13 Ch. D. at 771.
97. 28 Eng. Rep. 1297 (Ch. 1783), cited in Devlin, supra note 1, at 73.
98. Id. at 1297.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 1300.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. 29 Eng. Rep. 1086 (Ch. 1784), cited in Devlin, supra note 1, at 73.
104. 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674), cited in Wilkinson et al., supra note 5, at 72.
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gery, fraud, and misrepresentation alleged against an attorney by his
client.105 The Chancellor decided that the case hinged on a determi-
nation of the legal state of mind of the plaintiff.10 6 Because of the
subtle but technical "shades"' 1 7 of mental capacity, the Chancellor
concluded that, "[i]f the question was whether his understanding was
so depraved that he was incapable of executing a deed, that would be
a proper question for a jury.' 0 8 But the Chancellor stated further
that "an issue to be taken on so uncertain a subject seems to me to
bring very little light or information to the court: it would be impossi-
ble for a jury to mark the shades of his incapacity by any possible
endorsement.' 0 9 This decision assumes that a jury could discern
competence from incompetence, but that distinguishing technicalities
of mental capacity was beyond the "practical abilities and limitations
of juries." 10
Blad involved a difficult and political set of facts. Blad, who was
Danish, seized the property of Bamfield, who was English, in Iceland,
under supposed written permission from the King of Denmark."'
Bamfield claimed that the letters granting permission were invalid be-
cause of a treaty between the English and the Danish. 112 The Chan-
cellor, in response to Bamfield's request for a jury trial, considered it
"monstrous and absurd" that a "common jury should try whether the
English have a right to trade in Iceland."1 3 Clearly the Chancellor
felt that an issue such as that involved in Blad was too complicated for
a common jury.
The Chancellor also often prevented the Courts of Law from
hearing a case involving an action for account.1 14 In an account, both
parties claimed that the other party owed them monies for either work
105. See Welles, 29 Eng. Rep. at 1086.
106. See id. at 1089.
107. Id. at 1090.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
111. See Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992, 993 (Ch. 1674), cited in Wilkinson et al., supra
note 5, at 72.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 993. Support for withholding political issues from the jury is also found in a quote
from Hamilton:
I feel a deep and deliberate conviction that there are many cases in which the trial by
jury is an ineligible one. I think it so particularly in cases which concern the public
peace with foreign nations-that is, in most cases where the question turns wholly on
the laws of nations .... Juries cannot be supposed competent to investigations that
require a thorough knowledge of the laws and usages of nations.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
114. See Devlin, supra note 1, at 65; Wilkinson et al., supra note 5, at 72-73.
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performed or debt owed.1 15 These actions were often complex be-
cause of difficult contract theories intertwined with the action. For
example, in construction cases, the situation was often "complicated
by disputes over disallowances and deductions made by the architect
or engineer. 1 6 Duke of Marlborough v. Strong,117 decided in 1721, is
an example of one such dispute. The Chancellor prevented the case
from being heard in the Courts of Law because an account of this type
was too complex for a jury.
118
In summary, under English common law in 1791, the Chancellor
would prevent a jury trial in the Courts of Law whenever a case pos-
sessed characteristics that were beyond the understanding of a jury:
the involvement of extensive written materials, the existence of com-
plex legal theories, and actions for account, which typically involved
both extensive written materials as well as complex legal theories.
B. Colonial Adoption and Use of the Complexity Exception
While the English common law is the "black-letter" law for deter-
mining when the Seventh Amendment provides for a jury trial, other
sources exist for discerning the purposes of the Amendment. The op-
eration of early American law reveals how early American jurists in-
terpreted the English common law. By examining the actions in early
American law regarding the granting of jury trials, we can discern
whether a complexity exception was consistent with the interpretation
of the English common law at that time. 119 Of course, the best evi-
dence of the framers' opinion of a complexity exception would be lan-
guage about such an exception in the Seventh Amendment or its
legislative history. 20 Because no such evidence is forthcoming, one
must turn to other sources for clues.
115. See Devlin, supra note 1, at 65.
116. Id. at 68.
117. 1 Eng. Rep. 496 (H.L. 1721), cited in Devlin, supra note 1, at 68 n.92.
118. See id. at 496-98; see also Devlin, supra note 1, at 68 n.92 ("This case is cited as an early
example of court of equity decreeing an account in a case which did not fall within one of the
regular categories.").
119. Colonial law will not be examined in depth here, partially because of the extremely
segmented state of the legal system at the time, see supra Part II.A., and partially because analy-
sis of this type is only persuasive. However, specific language in early colonial cases is helpful in
interpreting the English common law, after which colonial law was modeled.
120. Scholars agree that no definitive answer is available through the records generated from
that time period. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 19, at 291-92; wolfram, supra note 25, at 639.
[Vol. 73:865
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION
One of the most prominent lawmakers of the time was Alexander
Hamilton.121 In the national debate over the ratification of the Con-
stitution, the Federalists asked Hamilton to respond to the concerns of
Anti-Federalists that the Constitution did not provide for a guarantee
of trial by jury in civil cases.'22 Hamilton, in Federalist Paper No. 83,
described how complex cases were treated in English common law
before the enactment of the Seventh Amendment. 123 Hamilton ob-
served that "extraordinary" cases were tried before the Chancellor in
equity, and should, therefore, be so treated in American law.124 Ham-
ilton also noted that the circumstances of cases heard in the courts of
equity are often "intricate ... [and] incompatible with the genius of
trials by jury."'1 25 Moreover, "the litigations usual in chancery fre-
quently comprehend a long train in minute and independent particu-
lars."'1 26 Therefore, Hamilton concluded, "[t]he nature of a court of
equity ... will tend gradually to . . . undermine the trial by jury, by
introducing questions too complicated for a decision in that mode."'1 27
Hamilton apparently believed that English law provided a way to re-
move complex cases from the jury, and that such a procedure benefit-
ted the legal system as a whole.128
There was no generally established practice in colonial law re-
garding the situations in which a jury trial was granted. As noted
above, all thirteen colonies had instituted some, but not a common,
form of trial by jury. In Federalist No. 83, Hamilton observed "[t]he
great difference between the limits of the jury trial in different
States.' 29 Modern scholarship bears this out. For instance, in one of
121. In addition to THE FEDERALIST No. 83, (Alexander Hamilton), Hamilton also authored
the majority of other Federalist Papers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 1, 6, 7, 81 (Alexander
Hamilton).
122. See Landsman, supra note 17, at 598.
123. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 523-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1904).
124. See id. at 527.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 528.
127. Id.
128. The significance of these statements is that, regardless of anyone's opinion concerning
the merits of a complexity exception, it is constitutional if it was a part of English common law
prior to 1791. Of course, it does not directly follow that the right will be exercised. The legisla-
ture could very well provide for a jury trial in all civil cases, even those that are complex. It does,
however, mean one simple thing-it is an option. Hamilton elaborates upon his view further by
stating, "But I must acknowledge that I cannot readily discern the inseparable connection be-
tween the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury in civil cases." THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at
521 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
129. Id. at 523. Hamilton stated further that:
The great difference between the limits of the jury trial in different States is not gener-
ally understood .... In this State, our judicial establishments resemble, more nearly
1998]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the most comprehensive articles to date written on the Seventh
Amendment, Edith Henderson shows that "the power of the civil jury
and the extent of judicial control over its verdicts varied enormously
and unsystematically from state to state.' 30 In addition, a compre-
hensive review of available case law during this period would not pro-
vide a definitive picture of the operation of colonial law because of
the limited amount of extant documents. Ms. Henderson notes that
"[b]ecause there are only scattered volumes of legal records and prac-
titioners' notes in print for the whole period before 1790, it is not now
possible to trace the growth of the divergence[ ]" in differing states'
practices with regard to jury trials in civil cases.' 3'
While the records of colonial cases are incomplete and not very
abundant, one early American case deserves recognition. President of
the Farmer's Bank v. Polk,132 decided in federal district court in 1821,
involved a case that called for an accounting. Referring to the facts of
the case, the court remarked that
[t]hese transactions are so complicated, so long and intricate, that it
is impossible for a jury to examine them with accuracy. They will
require time, assiduous attention and minute investigation, and are
involved in so much confusion and difficulty that no other tribu-
nal ... can afford the plaintiff a remedy. 133
Given the court's use of the term "accuracy," the logical concern of
the court was the "practical abilities and limitations of juries.' 34
than in any other, those of Great Britain. We have courts of common law, courts of
probates (analogous in certain matters to the spiritual courts in England), a court of
admiralty, and a court of chancery. In the courts of common law only, the trial by jury
prevails, and this with some exceptions. In all the others a single judge presides, and
proceeds in general either according to the course of the canon or civil law, without the
aid of a jury. In New Jersey, there is a court of chancery which proceeds like ours, but
neither courts of admiralty nor of probates, in the sense in which these last are estab-
lished with us. In that State the courts of common law have the cognizance of those
causes which with us are determinable in the courts of admiralty and of probates, and
of course the jury trial is more extensive in New Jersey than in New York. In Penn-
sylvania, this is perhaps still more the case, for there is no court of chancery in that
State, and its common-law courts have equity jurisdiction.
Id. at 523-24.
130. Henderson, supra note 19, at 299. Further, as stated by one scholar, "In light of the
variety of cases in which juries never were used in the Massachusetts Colony, it is not surprising
that in 1787 a Massachusetts Federalist observed that 'out of three or four hundred actions at a
court not more than ten are decided by jury."' Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 1, at 969
n.17.
131. Henderson, supra note 19, at 299-300.
132. 1 Del. Ch. 167, 167-68 (1821), cited in Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Respon-
sibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 201 (1990).
133. Id. at 175-76.
134. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
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C. Characteristics Considered by Courts in Invoking a
Complexity Exception
The majority of complex and lengthy trials are the product of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow for joinder of cases.
135
By encouraging the joinder and the consolidation of lawsuits, the Fed-
eral Rules make these cases more complex than they otherwise would
be. Of course, joinder does not make the issues any more difficult.
However, the Rules do result in (1) many more parties taking part in
one case than would otherwise be present, and (2) a corresponding
increase in the number of legal rules that come into play.
136
For the modern courts that have adopted the theory of a com-
plexity exception, their decision to invoke the exception arises when
"[a] suit is too complex for a jury. ' 137 A case is considered "too com-
plex" when "circumstances render the jury unable to decide in a
proper manner.1 38 Three characteristics of a case assist the court in
the determination of whether it is "too complex" for a jury trial: (1)
the operative details and nature of the trial, (2) the nature of the evi-
dence to be proposed at trial, and (3) the difficulty of the substantive
law to be applied to this evidence.
For the first characteristic, courts typically consider the number
of parties, probable length of the trial, and amount of evidence and
corresponding exhibits to be introduced into the record. 139 The
number of parties is relevant because of the added complexity associ-
ated with a trial consisting of numerous claims, counterclaims, and
cross-claims. 140 In these trials, jurors-who, unlike judges, have little
experience in deciphering large quantities of legal facts-have a diffi-
cult time reaching a well-reasoned decision.14a The trial length is im-
portant because, in today's society, cases may last years, which puts an
inordinate burden on jurors. 142
For the second characteristic, courts determine whether the aver-
age juror can reasonably or realistically understand the sophisticated
135. See e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 18 (joinder of claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (joinder of parties
necessary for adjudication); FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 22
(interpleader).
136. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text for an example of how these factors are
exhibited as the result of joinder of cases.
137. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980).
138. Id.
139. See id.; see also ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 444 (N.D. Cal.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Memorex v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
140. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
141. See ILC Peripherals, 458 F. Supp. at 448.
142. See infra notes 219-31 and accompanying text.
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evidence presented in the case.143 Opponents of a complexity excep-
tion point out that, while the evidence may be complex, the counsel's
task, as an officer of the court, is to make it understandable to the
average juror.144 This argument, however, misses the point of why a
complexity exception exists. In a complex case, presenting the issues
in an "understandable" way may involve glossing over many of the
intricacies and result in an inaccurate picture of the facts. 145 This
raises one of the essential questions regarding the complexity excep-
tion-is it possible to make all relevant concepts sufficiently intelligi-
ble to an average jury? As noted earlier, the common law of England
apparently did not think so, because the Chancellor often assumed
jurisdiction over cases he considered too complex for a jury.
For the third characteristic, courts examine how difficult it may
be for jurors to apply the substantive law to the facts presented at
trial. 146 This category reprises the previous two. The complexity of
the law in certain cases makes it unfair to subject a party to the deci-
sion of jurors who might not fully understand the testimony and evi-
dence presented to them. This factor lends itself to the argument that
the Seventh Amendment entails some sort of due process
consideration.
147
D. Current Arguments For and Against a Complexity Exception
Given the foregoing understanding of "complexity," proponents
of the complexity exception advance the following arguments to sup-
port their claim that courts should classify complex cases under equity
jurisdiction, which does not require trial by jury. "Equity jurisdiction"
refers to the types of cases in English common law that typically fell
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Proponents of the
143. See ILC Peripherals, 458 F. Supp. at 444, 446-47 (concluding that jurors, confronted with
a trial in which more than 2,000 exhibits would be introduced, were unable to competently reach
a decision where "technical and financial questions of the highest order" were involved).
144. See generally sources cited supra note 6 (collecting articles arguing against a complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment).
145. This is the underlying assumption and argument advanced by proponents of the Third
Circuit's ruling in In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment outweighed the right to a jury trial
provided for under the Seventh Amendment).
146. See id. at 1085.
147. See generally sources cited supra note 5 (collecting articles arguing for a complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment). The due process argument is discussed infra Part IV.B.
For now, it is sufficient to note that proponents of this theory explain that some situations result
in a conflict between the Fifth and Seventh Amendments (i.e., Fifth Amendment guaranteeing
due process, which may be jeopardized if the jury does not fully understand the substantive law,
and the Seventh Amendment guaranteeing trial by jury). See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Anti-
trust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1084.
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complexity exception first argue that, in 1791, the Court of Chancery
had general jurisdiction over cases that did not fit neatly into actions
that could be heard in the Courts of Common Law. 148 In other words,
even if courts apply a mechanistic interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment, any cases not finding matches in English common law
should be denied a jury trial. Second, proponents point out that the
Chancellor had the power to determine which cases were suited for
jury trial, and he determined that complex cases should be heard in
the Court of Chancery. 49 This practice in English common law estab-
lishes a precedent for the constitutionality of a complexity exception.
Third, as will be discussed in Part IV, proponents argue that footnote
ten in Ross v. Bernhard150 indicates that the Court has opened the
door for a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment.
151
Opponents of a complexity exception present three reasons for
refusing to interpret Ross as justifying a restriction on the Seventh
Amendment. First, they argue that there is no precedent from the
Supreme Court to support such an interpretation. 152 Second, they
point out that it would be unusual for the Supreme Court to change
constitutional law in a footnote. 153 Finally, because the Court ulti-
mately concluded in Ross that all the issues were jury issues, oppo-
nents to the complexity exception claim that this case made no inroads
toward identifying what type of issues can be withheld from the
jury.15
4
The leading case rejecting the idea of a complexity exception is In
re Financial Services Litigation,55 a case heard in the Ninth Circuit.
Eighteen separate cases were consolidated to be heard at trial, and
this complexity caused the district court to deny the right to a jury
trial. 156 The district court did so in reliance on the verbiage in foot-
148. See Devlin, supra note 1, at 52.
149. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1080-83.
150. 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
151. See generally sources cited supra note 5 (collecting articles arguing for a complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment).
152. Only one Supreme Court case, however, is required to establish binding precedent.
Further, while Markman is the Court's first visit of this issue since Ross, the Third Circuit has
concluded that there is a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment, see infra Part IV.B,
as well as various district courts, see infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the
Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 486, 525-26 (1975).
154. See generally supra note 5 (citing articles proposing that there is no complexity excep-
tion to the Seventh Amendment).
155. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
156. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979). For more details on the consolidation, see In re United States Fin. Sec.
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note ten in Ross,157 specifically, that the issues in the case were so
complex that they were beyond the "practical abilities and limitations
of the jury."'1 58 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling of the
district court, giving little deference to the footnote in Ross.159 The
court stated that it was "doubtful that the Supreme Court would at-
tempt to make such a radical departure from its prior interpretation of
a constitutional provision in a footnote.' 16
0
IV. THE COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION AND THE SUPREME COURT
This note argues that the Supreme Court has opened the door to
a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment with its reasoning
in Ross v. Bernard161 and, more recently, Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc.162 The above review of English common law prior to 1791,
combined with the Court's opinions in Ross and Markman, indicate
that a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment is constitu-
tional. This part describes the foundation for a complexity exeption in
the landmark Supreme Court cases of Ross v. Bernhard and Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc. This section also presents an alternative
argument for the constitutionality of complexity exception-the Sev-
enth Amendment's incorporation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
A. The Supreme Court's Adoption of the Complexity Exception
The Supreme Court has not mentioned a complexity exception to
the Seventh Amendment explicitly. 163 However, Ross and Markman
confuse the previously settled law. In fact, footnote ten in Ross is
given credit for originating the complexity exception. 164 In that foot-
Litig., 385 F. Supp. 586, 587-88 (J.P.M.L. 1974); In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp.
1403, 1403-04 (J.P.M.L. 1974).
157. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
158. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 710-13 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (citing Ross),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
159. 609 F.2d at 411.
160. Id. at 425.
161. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
162. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
163. The Court has only on rare occasion given an opinion on what specifically is preserved
to the jury. However, the Court has often accepted cases involving procedural questions regard-
ing the Seventh Amendment. See Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836, 836 (1973) (holding that
trial by jury is not constitutionally required in state civil proceedings); American Publ'g Co. v.
Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 465 (1897) (addressing requirement of unanimity of verdict); Baylis v.
Travellers' Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1885) (stating that questions of fact must be submitted
to jury).
164. See generally sources cited supra note 5 (collecting sources in favor of a complexity
exception).
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note, the Supreme Court recounted the criteria of the mechanistic ap-
proach for determining whether a case is "legal" or "equitable," but
added a third, previously unrecognized in Supreme Court case law:
the "practical abilities and limitations of juries."'1 65 Many believe this
language gives credence to a complexity exception.
Justice Souter added support to the complexity exception in
Markman when he enumerated "functional considerations" for dis-
trict courts to use in determining whether to grant a jury trial in a
patent case. 166 As these "functional considerations" have no relation
to the type of action (the typical factor considered), Markman sup-
ports the existence of a complexity exception to the Seventh
Amendment.
1. Ross v. Bernhard
In Ross, the plaintiffs brought a derivative action against the di-
rectors of a corporation.167 Although the circumstances would not
normally justify a jury trial, the Court found that, "[t]he Seventh
Amendment question depends upon the nature of the issue to be tried
rather than the character of the overall action" and ordered a jury
trial. 168 The dicta of the Court in Ross, however, has overshadowed
the outcome of the case. Specifically, the Court described a three-
prong test used to distinguish "legal" issues from "equitable" issues:
"[a]s our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by
considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such ques-
tions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries."'1 69 These last seven words spawned the entire
complexity exception debate.
170
Subsequent to Ross, the Supreme Court rarely accepted cases in-
terpreting the Seventh Amendment on jury trial grounds, instead fo-
cusing on other aspects of the Amendment. Two cases subsequent to
165. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
166. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
167. See Ross, 396 U.S. at 531.
168. Id. at 538.
169. Id. at 538 n.10 (emphasis added).
170. The Court has had several occasions to either clarify its point or deny the existence of a
complexity exception. The fact that it has not leaves open the possibility that the Court supports
the theory. Further, as Part III.A. indicates, the English common law supported the ideology of
a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment. See Devlin, supra note 1, at 107 ("[T]he
practical abilities and limitations of juries would have been . . . in the mind of a Chancellor in
1791. Further, if in any particular case he had thought the 'practical abilities' not up to the
complexities of the case, he would ... stop the suit at common law.").
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Ross addressing the right to jury trial were Pernell v. South Realty17 1
and Curtis v. Loether.172 In neither did the Court mention the "practi-
cal abilities and limitations of juries." This seems reasonable because
the Court did not, on either occasion, deem the issues presented
overly complex. Since Pernell and Curtis, the Court has remained rel-
atively quiet concerning Seventh Amendment interpretation. 173
Although Markman is the next Supreme Court decision on point,
there have been several intervening lower court opinions addressing
this issue. These decisions formed the backdrop against which the
Court in Markman wrote its decision.174
Of the four significant district court cases, three have interpreted
the Seventh Amendment as containing a complexity exception. 75 In
re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation is representative. There the
court described a point where "the complexity of a case may exceed
the ability of a jury to decide the facts in an informed and capable
manner."'1 76 Based on the rationale that the case was too complex for
the jury, the court denied the plaintiff the right to a jury trial.177
Moreover, a number of courts have ruled that the case before them
was not so complex as to justify circumvention of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 178 although their reasoning seems to assume that a complexity
exception exists.
171. 416 U.S. 363, 363 (1974).
172. 415 U.S. 189, 190 (1974).
173. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414 (1987); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105-06
(1985); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 324 (1978). Seventh Amendment issues
were addressed in all three of these cases, but never with regard to complexity issues.
174. This backdrop provides persuasive evidence that the Court, at a minimum, does not
strongly disagree with a complexity exception. If it did, Markman was an opportunity to express
its opinion. While silence is no basis for precedent, the "functional considerations" enumerated
in Markman are, as this note explains, operationally similar to a complexity exception.
175. The three district court cases finding a complexity exception to the Seventh Amend-
ment are Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (involving an
antitrust class action suit); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 447 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), affd sub nom. Memorex v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (involving antitrust
suit); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 103 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (involving securi-
ties litigation). The sole district court case to not find a complexity exception was Radial Lip
Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 227 (N.D. 11. 1977) (involving intellec-
tual property suit).
176. In re Boise Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. at 104.
177. See id.
178. E.g., Cotten v. Witco Chem. Corp., 651 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1981). Proponents of a
complexity exception have pointed to the language used in these opinions as support for their
view. For instance, in one case, the court stated that "maybe some facts are so difficult for
laymen to determine that they can be withdrawn from the jury." Soderbeck v. Burnett County,
752 F.2d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1985). One reason a court would make such a statement and not
acknowledge the existence of a complexity exception is if it felt there was not sufficient prece-
dent to support any other decision.
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2. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.179 provides evidence that
the Supreme Court is willing to recognize a complexity exception to
the Seventh Amendment. In Markman, the Supreme Court affirmed,
in a unanimous decision written by Justice Souter, the Federal Cir-
cuit's decision that the interpretation of a patent's construction is not
an issue for the jury.
180
The main question in Markman was whether the construction of a
patent, which describes the patentee's rights against infringement, is a
matter of law for the judge to determine or properly falls to a jury
under the Seventh Amendment guarantee. 18' The more specific ques-
tion in Markman was whether the invention of a system capable of
"monitor[ing] and report[ing] the status, location, and movement of
clothing in a dry-cleaning establishment" covered physical inventory
as well as cash inventory.
182
At trial in the district court, the jury found infringement of the
patent, determining that the patent referred to both physical and cash
inventory. 183 The district court then granted the defendant's motion
for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the patent referred to
physical inventory only.' 84 The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that,
"in a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and the obligation to
construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent
claim. 1
85
Before the Supreme Court, Markman claimed that the district
court's action violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
While not explicitly recognizing the existence of a complexity excep-
tion, Justice Souter enumerated "functional considerations" that dis-
trict courts should weigh to determine whether a particular issue is
subject to the Seventh Amendment's guarantee. 86 A court should
consider these "functional considerations" in addition to the tradi-
179. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
180. See id. at 372.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 374-75.
183. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536 (E.D. Pa. 1991),
afft'd, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aft'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
184. See id. at 1536-37.
185. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over all patent case appeals from the district courts.
186. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388; accord Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (holding
that when there is no clear answer to the Seventh Amendment question, "administration of
justice" allows courts to weigh strengths of judges against those of juries).
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tional mechanistic approach that otherwise applies.187 They are irrele-
vant to the legal versus equitable distinction. For example, the Court
listed the superior ability of judges to comprehend legal documents as
support for their position.'8 8 This reasoning by the Court was clearly
aimed at determining whether the judge was in a better position to
decide the issues of fact than the jury, not whether the action was legal
or equitable in nature. Based on the Court's reasoning, Markman
supports the existence and application of a complexity exception.
In the first section of the opinion, Justice Souter reviewed the
constitutional grant to Congress "to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."' 18 9 In
short, the grant is in return for the patent holder allowing the public to
benefit from the invention. 90 Justice Souter analyzed the Seventh
Amendment question in section two of the opinion, noting that the
determination of whether there is a right to a jury trial depends, first,
on the mechanistic approach. 19' The Court found it well grounded in
eighteenth century English practice that a right to a jury trial existed
in a patent infringement case. 192 However, the Court was unable to
conclude the same on the issue of patent construction. 93 Therefore,
the Court concluded that "the best hope lies in comparing the modern
practice to earlier ones whose allocation to court or jury we do
know."'1 94 Contrary to Markman's claim, the Court found no evidence
that juries must have interpreted a patent's construction in order to
reach a verdict: "[t]here is no more reason to infer that juries supplied
plenary interpretation of written instruments in patent litigation than
in other cases implicating the meaning of documentary terms, and we
do know that in other kinds of cases during this period judges, not
juries, ordinarily construed written documents. 1 95
Finding no clear answer through an analysis of common law, the
Court next reviewed the relevant case law.196 The Court cited Winans
187. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
188. See id.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
190. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
191. See id. at 376. The Court refers to this methodology as the "historical test." However,
for purposes of consistency, this note will refer to the concept as the "mechanistic approach."
192. See id at 377.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 378. One can infer from the Court's tone that they are tiring of trying to find
similarity between modem day actions and those known to the common law prior to 1791.
195. Id. at 381-82.
196. See id. at 384.
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v. Denmead'97 as evidence that a patent's construction was an issue
for the judge, not the jury. 198 The Court next distinguished two cases
relied on by Markman on the grounds that the issue left for the jury to
decide involved "product identification," as opposed to patent con-
struction.199 As further support, the Court cited treatises by Walker
and Robinson. 200 Both treatises argued that patent construction was
an issue for the court to decide, not the jury.
201
In the next section, Justice Souter stated that "[w]here history
and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations also
play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of
art. '202 This point in the Court's opinion suggests the Court's dissatis-
faction with the mechanistic approach. The "functional considera-
tions" are evidently the Court's way of considering other facets of the
English common law that had been ignored. Justice Souter likened
his reasoning to a previous case, where the Court stated that when an
issue "falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple
historical fact, the fact/law discrimination at times has turned on a de-
termination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice,
one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question. '20 3 Justice Souter concluded that "judges, not juries, are the
better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms. ' 204 He
then pointed to judges' extensive training and experience with written
documents, concluding that the "judge, from his training and disci-
pline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instru-
ments than a jury [and is], therefore, more likely to be right, in
performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be. '20 5 This
197. 56 U.S. 330 (1853).
198. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
199. Id. at 386.
200. See id. at 387 (citing A. WALKER, PATENT LAWS § 75, at 68 (3d ed. 1895)); id. at 388
(citing W. ROBINsON, LAW OF PATENTS § 732, at 481-83 (1890)).
201. See id. at 387-88.
202. Id. at 388 (emphasis added). Upon examination of the arguments in Souter's opinion, it
becomes obvious that the "rule" used is not restricted, or unique in any way, to patent cases.
Therefore, the holding in Markman will likely instigate counsel to push courts to decide some
issues where there is no eighteenth century analogue to the instant case. Also, if the attention
generated by a mere footnote in Ross hinting of the possibility of a complexity exception is any
indication, an entire opinion discussing the topic in particularity, concluding as it does, will gen-
erate even more.
203. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
114 (1985)).
204. Id.




statement reflects the Supreme Court's support for a complexity ex-
ception to the Seventh Amendment.
20 6
Justice Souter's opinion reveals that the Court created no new
doctrine in Markman. On the contrary, the Court's enumeration of
the "functional considerations" arose from a more thorough analysis
of the English common law, in which these types of considerations
were often taken into account. Of course, the Court first attempted to
handle the case using the traditional mechanistic approach. Realizing,
however, that comparing the action to those tried under English com-
mon law before 1791 was extremely difficult and subjective, the Court
listed certain functional considerations that had not been used by the
Court to date. Further, the underlying rationale behind the Court's
description of the functional considerations is very similar to the ra-
tionale underlying the complexity exception. Therefore, Markman is
just the most recent step in the evolution of Seventh Amendment
interpretation.
Proponents of a complexity exception are striving to accomplish a
relevant and important goal. Almost universally, proponents do not
want civil jury trials abolished, but rather seek a narrow application of
a complexity exception. 20 7 Most proponents of a complexity excep-
tion think parties to litigation should have access to a judicial proce-
dure capable of achieving justice when a jury trial would be unlikely
to do so. 20 8 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Markman high-
206. One outcome seems probable in the arena of intellectual property cases in the wake of
Markman. Specifically, because the only issue in many patent suits is the dispute as to the inter-
pretation of the patent, the holding in Markman will almost certainly result in more judgments
by the court, sitting without a jury. "As many as 90 percent of these cases will be decided on a
motion for summary judgment." Victoria Slind-Flor, Ruling Boosts Judges' Role in Patents,
NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1996, at B1 (quoting Jack C. Goldstein, a former head of the American Bar
Association's intellectual property law section). Others have proclaimed that even if construc-
tion is not one of the dispositive issues, parties will be more inclined to settle given the courts'
interpretation of the patent. See Steven D. Glazer & Steven J. Rizzi, Markman: The Supreme
Court Takes Aim at Patent Juries, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., May 1996, at 4.
Another portion of the Court's holding that has not yet received as much attention, possibly
overshadowed by the primary holding, is the Court's ruling regarding credibility issues. The
Court stated that the inconsistent expert testimony created credibility issues that were inherently
for the jury to decide. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 389-90. However, the Court stated further that
situations when the construction may turn on contradictory expert evidence will be in the minor-
ity, and in such cases, "[t]he decisionmaker ... construing the patent is in the better position to
ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition fully comports with the specification and
claims .... " Id. The result of this argument is that a court could decide issues of fact, namely
the credibility of witnesses. Opponents' concerns of the slippery-slope might have a sounder
argument against the Court's argument here, rather than on strictly construing the Seventh
Amendment.
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lights one possible scenario to accomplish this goal. Specifically, in
Markman, the Court did not withhold the entire case from the jury.
20 9
Instead, the Court broke down the issues and allocated them between
the judge and jury, based on who was better able to decide them; in
other words, by taking the complexity of the issues in the case into
account.
210
B. The Seventh Amendment and Due Process
In addition to the theory of a complexity exception based on Eng-
lish common law, there is also a second theory for a complexity excep-
tion based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
211
The rationale for this argument is one of fundamental fairness. If a
jury decides complex issues that are beyond its competence, the par-
ties will not receive due process of law.
The Third Circuit adopted this approach in In re Japanese Elec-
tronic Products Antitrust Litigation,212 decided in 1980. This case re-
sulted from the joinder by the district court of two cases.213 The first
involved a suit by the National Union Electrical Corporation against
numerous Japanese television manufacturers. 214 The plaintiff in the
209. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 387-88.
210. The end result was that while the jury was left with the responsibility for determining
whether an infringement was present, the court would provide the jury with its interpretation of
the patent's terms. See id.
211. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "No person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
212. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
213. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 892 n.3, n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (citing the two cases as Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., No. 74-
2451 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 20, 1974) and National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., No. 1706-70 (D.N.J., filed Dec. 21, 1970), vacated sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Anti-
trust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980)). Subsequently, these two cases were consolidated for
pretrial proceedings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See id. (citing In re Japanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 388 F. Supp. 565 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975)).
214. The ten principal defendants in the National and Zenith cases are Mitsubishi Corpora-
tion, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Toshiba Corporation, Hitachi, Ltd., Sharp Corporation,
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Sanyo Electric Co., and Sony Corporation, all Japanese con-
sumer electronic products manufacturers, and two American companies, Motorola, Inc. and
Sears, Roebuck & Co. See Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at 893. Sony Corporation and its subsidiary Sony
Corporation of America are only defendants in the National case. See id. at 893 n.6. The other
seven principal Japanese defendants are named in both cases, as are eight of their subsidiaries:
Matsushita Electric Corporation of America, Toshiba America, Inc., Hitachi Sales Corporation
of Japan, Hitachi Sales Corporation of America, Sharp Electronics Corporation, Sanyo Electric,
Inc., Sanyo Electric Trading, Inc., and Mitsubishi International Corporation. See id. The parties
named only in the Zenith case are Sears, Roebuck & Co., Motorola, Inc., Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation, Sanyo Manufacturing Co., Matsushita Electronics Corporation, Matsushita Elec-
tric Trading Co., and Quasar Electronics Corporation. See id. The plaintiffs also named, as co-
conspirators, approximately 100 other entities with global operations, both American and Japa-
nese. See id. at 893.
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second case was Zenith Radio Corporation, who was also suing the
same defendants as National, plus an additional seven companies.
215
Zenith, a domestic manufacturer, had initiated a lawsuit against Japa-
nese television manufacturers for violations of the antitrust and inter-
national trade laws.216 The plaintiffs also alleged conspiracies that
violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,217 as well as § 73 of
the Wilson Tariff Act.
218
The plaintiffs demanded a jury trial.219 Fourteen of the defend-
ants objected to this on the grounds that the case raised issues too
complex for a jury to decide. 220 The defendants acknowledged that a
jury trial was normally granted in suits under the antitrust and an-
tidumping laws, but they claimed that their case involved issues too
complicated for a jury.221 For example, part of the defense to be
raised at trial involved foreign currency fluctuations and complicated
marketing maneuvers, all of which affected the pricing models used in
the establishment of prices for their merchandise. 222 The defendants
also argued that proper resolution of the conspiracy claims required
familiarity with the business environment and marketing conditions in
Japan, and application of factual findings to thousands of transac-
tions.223 Finally, the defendants maintained that underlying the afore-
mentioned burdens to the jury would be complex issues involving
predatory intent.224 The district court noted that the trial might last
more than one year, and that millions of documents would be intro-
duced at trial, not to mention the depositions that exceeded one hun-
dred thousand pages.225 In spite of this, the district court granted a
jury trial, stating it could not find any authority for acknowledging a
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment.
226
215. See id.
216. See id. at 893-94. The domestic manufacturers claimed that the Japanese defendants
were price gauging to gain an unfair advantage in the U.S. television market. The domestic
manufacturers also claim that the Japanese defendants subsequently sold merchandise at prices
which violated the Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994). See Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at
894.
217. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
218. Id. § 8.
219. See Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at 896.
220. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980).
221. See id. at 1073-75.
222. See id. at 1074.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 1074-75.
225. See id. at 1073.
226. See Zenith, 478 F. Supp. 889, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.22 7 The ap-
proach used by the Third Circuit to justify a complexity exception dif-
fered from the one suggested in either Ross or Markman. The court's
analysis centered around the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The court recognized that if the complexity of the legal issues inter-
fered with the jury's understanding of the evidence or the relevant
legal rules, the Seventh Amendment guarantee to trial by jury was not
applicable. 22 8 In so doing, the court ruled that a "suit is too complex
for a jury when circumstances render the jury unable to decide in a
proper manner. '"229
The court defined complexity to be "any set of circumstances
which singly or in combination render a jury unable to decide in the
foregoing rational manner. '230 Specifically, the court laid out criteria
in an effort to provide an objective basis to guide district court judges
in their determination of when it would be unreasonable to expect a
jury to understand a case. One of the considerations established by
the court was the overall size of the suit, including the amount of evi-
dence to be introduced, the time required for the trial, and the
number and difficulty of legal issues.231 Another was the difficulty of
the legal bases of the case.232 Although the court made mention of
footnote ten in Ross, it did not hinge its decision on the rationale ad-
vanced there.233 In addition, the court proclaimed that "[a] jury that
cannot understand the evidence and the legal rules to be applied pro-
vides no reliable safeguard against erroneous decisions. '2 34 The court
stated that "[t]he primary value promoted by due process in factfind-
ing procedures is 'to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.' 235 Fi-
nally, the court held "the most reasonable accommodation between
the requirements of the [F]ifth and [S]eventh [A]mendments to be a
denial of jury trial when a jury will not be able to perform its task of
rational decisionmaking with a reasonable understanding of the evi-
dence and the relevant legal standards."2 36
227. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir. 1980).
228. See id. at 1084-86.
229. Id. at 1079.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 1088.
232. See id. at 1088-89.
233. See id. at 1079-80.
234. Id. at 1084.
235. Id. (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 13 (1979)).




The theory of a complexity exception is consistent with the opera-
tion of English common law prior to 1791, and therefore a constitu-
tional exercise of the courts' power under the Seventh Amendment.
Part II of this note established that the Seventh Amendment grants
the right to a civil jury trial in accordance with the operation of Eng-
lish common law. Specifically, under the Seventh Amendment, a civil
jury trial is granted in instances in which one was provided for under
the operation of English common law prior to 1791. Further, Part III
concluded that, under English common law prior to 1791, the Chan-
cellor often invoked his power to remove cases from the Courts of
Common Law on the basis of complexity, deciding them instead in the
Court of Chancery.
Courts have begun to realize that the mechanistic approach to
interpreting the Seventh Amendment is no longer an effective method
of interpretation. Specifically, deciding whether to grant a jury trial
based on a static list respects the form but not the substance of Eng-
lish common law, to which courts should turn in reading the Seventh
Amendment.
Before Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. ,237 most scholars
deemed the Court's intention in footnote ten in Ross v. Bernhard238 to
have been misinterpreted. This footnote claimed that a consideration
in granting a jury trial is the "practical abilities and limitations of ju-
ries. '' 239 The Court further strengthened this line of reasoning in
Markman, lending additional support to the theory of a complexity
exception. While Justice Souter's opinion in Markman did not explic-
itly create a complexity exception, the "functional considerations" re-
ferred to are not in any way unique to patent cases.240 They amount
to a complexity consideration in other cases as well. Thus, the Court
has laid the groundwork for articulating a doctrine of a complexity
exception that a proper reading of the Seventh Amendment in light of
the 1791 English common law only reinforces. Whether the Court
chooses to construct an edifice upon this spadework remains to be
seen.
237. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
238. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
239. Id.
240. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
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